Introduction by Sinclair, M
Whether or not the nineteenth century is or still is the most obscure, as 
Martin  Heidegger  once  remarked,  of  all  the  centuries  of  modernity,1 
among contemporary Anglophone philosophers nineteenth-century French 
philosophy is much less well known than the German, British or North-
American thinking of the same period. Henri Bergson’s celebrity early in 
the  twentieth  century  produced  a  few English-language  studies  of  the 
recent history of French philosophy, but the decline of Bergson’s influence 
left the tradition that he develops in an almost complete obscurity.2 After 
the  English  translation  of  Félix  Ravaisson’s  seminal  1838  doctoral 
dissertation  Of Habit  in 2008,3 the present volume of essays by a figure 
who was in many ways France’s most influential philosopher in the second 
half of the century, and who was pivotal in the ‘spiritualist’ tradition that 
runs from Maine de Biran at the beginning of the century to Bergson as its 
end, should dissipate some more of this obscurity. It contains the most 
important of the shorter pieces – in philosophy, certainly, but also in art-
theory, archaeology, pedagogy, theology and the history of religions – that 
Ravaisson wrote from the beginning of  his  long career to his  death in 
1900. The volume should therefore facilitate the nascent English-language 
reception of Ravaisson’s work as a whole, and provide increased historical 
context to the recent, second wave of English-language Bergson studies.
Ravaisson  –  whose  full  name  became  Jean-Gaspard-Félix  Laché 
Ravaisson-Mollien – was born in 1813 in Namur, then in France, where his 
father, François-Ambroise-Damien Laché-Ravaisson, was city treasurer. His 
parents left the city when French rule of Belgium ended with Napoleon’s 
defeat the following year, and his father, déclassé in that he was unable to 
obtain  a  comparable  position,  died  the  year  after  that.  His  mother, 
Pauline-Gaspard  Mollien,  though  related  to  Nicolas-François  Mollien, 
Treasury Minister under Napoleon, was left  to raise her two sons while 
1 Martin Heidegger,  Holzwege (Frankfurt  am Main: Klostermann, 1994), 
p.99/Off  the  Beaten  Track,  trans.  J.  Young  and  K.  Haynes  (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002), p.75.
2 See, for example, Arthur Lovejoy, ‘Some Antecedents of the Philosophy 
of Bergson: the Conception of “Real Duration”’,  Mind XXII (1913) 465-83; 
L.  Susan  Stebbing,  Pragmatism  and  French  Voluntarism  (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1914); and J. Alexander Gunn, Modern French 
Philosophy:  A Study of the Development since Comte (London: Fisher & 
Unwin, 1922). Two illuminating studies of the work of Pierre Maine de Biran 
stand  out  amidst  the  general  obscurity  of  nineteenth-century  French 
philosophy  within  the  Anglophone world  during  the  second half  of  the 
twentieth century: Philip P. Hallie, Maine de Biran: Reformer of Empiricism 
(Harvard University Press, 1959) and F. C. T.  Moore,  The Psychology of 
Maine de Biran (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970).    
3 Félix  Ravaisson,  Of Habit,  trans.  and ed.  C.  Carlisle  and  M.  Sinclair, 
preface by Cathérine Malabou (London: Continuum, 2008).
managing an office of the Royal Lottery in Dunkerque. Both boys gained a 
taste  from  her  for  music  and  the  arts;  her  younger  son,  the  future 
philosopher,  was taught to paint also by students of  David,  and would 
later exhibit his own work at the Paris Salon under the name Laché.4 Her 
brother, Gaspard-Théodore Mollien, an explorer who wrote popular books 
about  his  adventures  in  the jungles  of  Senegal  (and who survived the 
legendary 1816 Medusa shipwreck famously painted by Gericault), took a 
special interest in his gifted younger nephew’s education, and Ravaisson, 
much later, added his uncle’s surname to his own.5
After brilliant success at the Collège Rollin in Paris – in 1833 he won 
first  prize  in  the  philosophy  section  of  a  national  competition,  the 
Concours général des collèges de France, with a dissertation on method – 
Ravaisson began his studies at university at a time when Victor Cousin’s 
‘spiritualist eclecticism’ was coming to dominate French philosophy. With 
the narrow sensualism and naturalism of the Ideological school,  French 
philosophy had been “in a hole”,6 but when Cousin began to emphasise 
the free activity and moral autonomy of the mind, in a manner that was 
seen to be as anticlerical as it  was antimaterialist,  he seemed to offer 
philosophical  renewal.  Upon  the  July  revolution  of  1830  establishing  a 
liberal  constitutional  monarchy,  and  after  having  been  barred  from 
teaching under the Bourbon restoration because of his liberalism, Cousin 
rose to an almost total control of the institutions of philosophy in France: 
Professor of Ancient Philosophy at the Sorbonne and director of the Ecole 
Normale,  as well  as  Peer in  France’s  upper house and member of  the 
4 On Ravaisson’s painting and drawing, see Tullio Viola’s ‘The Serpentine 
Life of Félix Ravaisson: Art, Drawing, Scholarship and Philosophy’ in Et in 
imagine ego: Facetten von Bildakt und Verkörperung, edited by U. Feist 
and  M.  Rath  (Berlin:  Akademie  Verlag,  2012),  155-174.  Viola’s  short 
intellectual biography of Ravaisson should be read alongside this one, and 
I am indebted to it on many points.
5 There  is  a  tendency  in  English-language  accounts  to  confuse 
Ravaisson’s uncle Gaspard-Théodore Mollien with Nicolas-François Mollien, 
Napoleon’s Treasurer, and thus to elevate unduly the young Ravaisson’s 
social  standing.  For  clarity  on  this  point,  see  the  best  source  on 
Ravaisson’s life, namely Louis Léger’s 1901 discourse on his predecessor 
at the Académie des Inscriptions et de Belles-Lettres:  Notice sur la vie et  
les travaux de M. Ravaisson-Mollien in  Comptes rendus des séances de 
Académie des Inscriptions et de Belles-Lettres 45 (1901) 327-72. Available 
at:  http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/crai_0065-
0536_1901_num_45_3_16840.  All  translations  are  my  own  unless 
otherwise stated.
6 Théodore  Jouffroy,  as  cited  by  Pierre  Macherey,  ‘Les  débuts 
philosophiques de Victor Cousin’,  Corpus  18 (1991):  Victor Cousin, ed. P. 
Vermeren, 29-49, p.31.
Royal Commission on Public Education, in 1840 he became President of 
the Jury of the agrégation – the competitive examination for positions in 
the state education system – in philosophy and, briefly, Minister of Public 
Instruction.  From  these  positions,  Cousin  worked  to  reform  French 
education  and  establish  philosophy  within  it  as  a  serious,  historically 
orientated discipline taught methodically at university and in the  lycées. 
He  did  this  while  defending  the  discipline  against  attacks  from 
traditionalists who would have preferred to see philosophy return to being 
a handmaiden of theology, and from republicans who, deriding the new 
ranks of ‘salaried philosophers’, the ranks of what Cousin described as his 
‘regiment’, demanded that philosophy serve socialist political objectives.7
The  combined  effect  of  Cartesianism,  the  Revolution  and  the 
Ideological school had meant that philosophy in France had lost contact 
with much of its history, and Cousin – translator of Plato and Proclus – did 
important work rediscovering the tradition. With this renewed historical 
awareness,  Cousin’s  ‘spiritualist’  philosophy  took  the  form  of  an 
‘eclecticism’,  according to which all  possible philosophical  positions fall 
under  the  four  headings  of  idealism,  materialism,  scepticism  and 
mysticism.  The  history  of  philosophy  is  the  expression  of  these 
archetypes, and the task of thinking in the present consists in synthesising 
the truths, and rejecting the errors, to be found in each of them. If both 
materialism and mysticism were to different degrees to be rejected (in 
time Cousin would accommodate revealed, Christian religion), this critical 
enterprise was to be grounded on a synthesis of idealism and scepticism. 
Cousin  proposed  to  resolve  the  differences  between  German  idealist 
philosophy,  particularly  the  work  of  F.  W.  J.  Schelling,  and  British 
empiricism, particularly the Scottish common-sense school. A spiritualist 
and eclectic philosophy had to preserve itself from the excesses of idealist 
speculation and empiricist scepticism, whilst synthesising both by means 
of  a  certain  liberal  bon  sens,  just  as  the  July  monarchy  represented, 
according  to  the  ‘Citizen  King’  Louis-Philippe,  a  juste  milieu,  a  liberal 
middle-of-the-road  between  the  figures  of  reaction  and  socialist 
republicanism that had crystallised in France.8
Ravaisson came directly into Cousin’s orbit in 1835, when, at the age 
of twenty-one, he was the winner – the joint winner, since the prize was 
also  awarded  to  the  dissertation  submitted  by  Carl-Ludwig  Michelet,  a 
disciple of Hegel’s and Extraordinary Professor in Berlin9 – of a competition 
7 See Joseph Ferrari, Les philosophes salariés (Paris: Payot, 1983 [1849]).
8 For this analogy, see Patrice Vermeren, ‘Ravaisson en son temps et en 
sa thèse’, Les Etudes Philosophiques 1993/1, 65-86, and the whole of his 
Victor  Cousin:  le  jeu de la philosophie et de l’état (Paris:  L’Harmattan, 
1995).
9 C.L.  Michelet,  Examen  critique  de  l’ouvrage  d’Aristote  intitulé  
Métaphysique, Paris, 1836; reprinted with a preface by J.-F. Courtine, Paris: 
Vrin, 1982.
concerning  Aristotle’s  Metaphysics  instigated  by  Cousin  at  the  newly 
reinstated Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques.10 Candidates were 
to illuminate the  Metaphysics by analysing its structure and content, by 
“accounting  for  its  history,  showing  its  influence  on  later  systems  in 
Antiquity and Modernity”, and by “discussing the share of truth and the 
share of falsity to be found within it”.11 This brief may appear impossibly 
broad for contemporary specialists, but it was crucial to renew study of 
the  Metaphysics,  since,  as  Ravaisson  notes,  this  foundational  text  had 
been subject to “general discredit for over two centuries in France, due to 
the thick veils in which scholasticism had enveloped it”.12 The situation 
was quite different across the Rhine, and Ravaisson, an autodidact in his 
Aristotelianism,  responded  to  recent  German  philological  and 
philosophical  scholarship  on  the  Metaphysics and  the  history  of 
philosophy.13 He was also markedly influenced – perhaps largely indirectly 
at  this  stage,  through  this  historical  scholarship  –  by  Schelling’s 
philosophy  of  identity,  by  the  idea  that  philosophy  can  access,  in  an 
‘intellectual intuition’, an absolute that constitutes the prior ground, the 
identity  in  difference,  of  mind  and  world.  Schelling  is  cited  in  this 
dissertation submitted in 1834, Ravaisson’s first major work of philosophy, 
and also in his last, ‘Philosophical Testament’, Chapter XI of the present 
volume,  but  the  extent  of  the  influence  of  both  Schelling’s  early 
philosophy of identity and his later ‘positive philosophy’ on Ravaisson’s 
intellectual development is uncertain. The extent to which there is here 
influence rather than merely a kind of natural affinity is a “nice problem in 
the  history  of  ideas”.14 It  is  clear,  at  the  very  least,  that  the  German 
philosopher  was  right,  when  he  read  Cousin’s  report  on  the  Aristotle 
competition, to sense something of a kindred spirit in the young French 
10 Napeoleon’s  animus  against  those  he  had  mockingly  named  the 
‘Idéologues’ led him to suppress the Académie des Sciences Morales et 
Politiques in 1803.
11 Ravaisson,  Essai  sur  la  Métaphysique d’Aristote,  vol.  I,  Paris,  1837, 
p.11.  Most  of  the  original  editions  of  Ravaisson’s  work,  including  the 
reports  for  the  Ministry  of  Public  Instruction,  are  available  on  Gallica 
(http://gallica.bnf.fr/),  but it  would be ungainly to provide the particular 
electronic addresses each time.
12 Ravaisson, Essai sur la Métaphysique d’Aristote I, p.5.
13 On these sources, see Joseph Dopp, Félix Ravaisson: la formation de sa 
pensée  d’après  des  documents  inédits  (Louvain:  Editions  de  l’Institut 
Supérieur  de  Philosophie,  1933),  pp.72-80.  See  also  Denis  Thouard, 
Aristote  au  XIXème  siècle  (Lille:  Presses  Universitaires  du  Septentrion, 
2004).   
thinker.15 It  is  also clear that Schelling’s critical preface to a volume of 
Cousin’s  work,  which  Ravaisson  translated  at  Cousin’s  behest  in  1835 
during a brief period when he worked as the latter’s secretary, helped the 
young French philosopher discern the limitations of the Eclectic project. In 
his brief introduction to this translation, Ravaisson describes Schelling as 
the “greatest philosopher of our century”.16
In  1836  Ravaisson  achieved  first  place  in  the  agrégation  in 
philosophy, and in Cousin’s estimation,  which possibly was sensitive to 
Ravaisson’s snub, the laureate was  hors de ligne, far above the rest but 
also  ‘out  of  line’.17 In  the  following  year,  he  published  a  substantially 
reworked first part of his Aristotle dissertation as Volume I of his Essai sur 
la  Métaphysique  d’Aristote.  A  second  volume  studying  the  fate  of 
Aristotelianism  in  Greek  thinking  up  to  and  including  Neoplatonism 
appeared in 1846, but both the projected third and fourth volumes tracing 
its reception in the three great monotheisms until the end of the Middle 
ages and in modernity, respectively, never appeared.18 On certain points, 
Ravaisson’s philological contributions to study of the  Metaphysics in the 
first  volume  are,  as  Pierre  Aubenque  has  noted,  “still  authoritative”, 
whereas his attempt to systematise Aristotle’s ontological and theological 
doctrine is more free than immediately faithful.19 It is hardly controversial 
to state that Aristotle resists the idealist abstractions of Pythagoreanism 
14 Jean  Baruzi,  ‘Introduction’  in  Félix  Ravaisson,  De  l’habitude (Paris: 
Alcan, 1933), p.1. For three of the more recent studies of the question, see 
J.-F. Courtine, ‘Les relations de Ravaisson et de Schelling’ in Jean Quillien 
(ed.), La  réception  de  la  philosophie  allemande  en  France  au XIXe et 
au XXe siècles (Lille:  Presses  du  Septentrion,  1994), 111-134;  C.  Mauve, 
‘Ravaisson, lecteur et interprète de Schelling’, Romantisme 25 (1995): 65-
74; and Gaëll Guibert,  Félix Ravaisson: d’une philosophie première à la  
philosophie de la révélation de Schelling (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2007).
15 See  Dopp,  pp.127-8,  who  presents  a  Ravaisson  very  strongly 
influenced by Schelling.
16 Jugement de Schelling sur la philosophie de M. Cousin, translated with 
a  preface  by  F.  Ravaisson,  Nouvelle  Revue  germanique  October  1835, 
p.65.
17 See Vermeren, ‘Ravaisson en son temps et en sa thèse’, p.69.
18 Charles  Devivaise  published some of  Ravaisson’s  work towards the 
third volume as Essai sur la Métaphysique d’Aristote: Fragments du Tome 
III (Paris: Vrin, 1953).
19 Pierre  Aubenque,  ‘Ravaisson  interprète  d’Aristote’,  Les  Etudes 
philosophiques 1984/4, 435-450, p.437.
and  Platonism  by  attempting  to  apprehend  the  individuality  of  the 
particular being as being in a primary sense; and that he thus attempts to 
redeem  the  natural  world  of  particular  things  in  their  change  and 
movement.  On  Ravaisson’s  reading,  however,  Aristotle  does  this  in 
considering the natural thing, which has ‘in itself the principle of its own 
movement’,  as structured by an immanent teleological principle that is 
l’âme, soul or spirit; “the internal principle of change, nature is … spirit”.20 
This claim, according to which all moving things are ensouled, may well 
amount, as Aubenque has it, to failing to see that hylozoism is not co-
extensive  with  hylomorphism  in  Aristotle,  and  that  on  this  point  the 
Philosopher perceives an analogy rather than identity: the soul is to the 
body  like form is to matter.21 In any case,  Ravaisson adopts Aristotle’s 
hylomorphic  conception  of  spirit:  it  is  “not  a  substance …,  a  subject”, 
which is to say that it is not an extra thing existing behind the scenes, 
beneath appearances, but is “a form, the form of a singular (un seul et 
unique)  body whose individuality  and life  it  constitutes”.22 In  this  way, 
Ravaisson  grapples  with  the  traditional  Aristotelian  problem  of  the 
principle of individuation: this cannot be matter, indeterminate and next 
to nothing, but nor can it simply be form, inherently general. Spirit is not 
independent of body, is “something of the body”, and though not simply 
form, is the “unity of form and actuality”.23 Ravaisson thus recognises the 
centrality of Aristotle’s interpretation of being as energeia, ‘actuality’, and 
his spiritualisation of Aristotle’s physics finds its main justification in the 
account of pure actuality within the Metaphysics’ theology. Given that the 
supreme  being  as  pure  energeia –  actuality  unadulterated  by  matter, 
movement  and  potentiality  –  is  noein,  thought  necessarily  thinking  of 
nothing but itself,  and given that the actuality of the physical world is 
different not in kind but only in purity to the actuality of this principal 
being, the path is open to a ‘noetic’, spiritualist and unitary interpretation 
of Aristotle’s onto-theology. Aristotle thinks being in the highest sense as 
energeia, but,  according  to  Ravaisson’s  panpsychist  position,  actuality, 
everywhere, is ‘thought’, but not always of a self-conscious variety.
Ravaisson reads Aristotle in this sense as a thinker of continuity, of a 
graduated  chain  of  spiritual  being  that  begins  even  in  the  lowest, 
apparently  inert  and  randomly  formed  matter  to  the  highest  being: 
“[nature]  can  free  itself  only  by  degrees  from the  ties  of  matter  and 
necessity.  It  tends  towards  its  goal  and  never  loses  sight  of  it;  but  it 
cannot  immediately  raise  itself  up  to  it.  It  is  only  by  an  ascending 
progression of forms that it attains the highest form. A scale of existences 
20 Ravaisson, Essai sur la Métaphysique d’Aristote I, p.419.
21 Aubenque, ‘Ravaisson interprète d’Aristote’ I, p.438.
22 Ravaisson, Essai sur la Métaphysique d’Aristote I, p.420.      
23 Ravaisson, Essai sur la Métaphysique d’Aristote I, p.421.
is  developed which fills,  without  leaving a void,  the whole category of 
substance and Being. It is like one and the same power, from organism to 
organism, from soul to soul, that climbs in a continuous movement to the 
peak  of  pure  activity;  it  is  being  emerging  gradually  from stupor  and 
sleep”.24 This ascending progression, however, consists of a – decidedly 
Germanic – odyssey of spirit involving a form of undeveloped immediacy, 
a form of alienation and then its overcoming. Desire in nature – whereby 
the  natural  being  realises  its  goal  instinctively,  without  reflection  and 
more or less immediately – becomes increasingly separated from its goal 
in human, voluntary consciousness, but finds a new, perfect immediacy in 
the highest being: “first, unity, confused unity, matter and sensibility; next 
the  oppositions  and  abstractions  of  the  understanding;  finally the 
individuality and superior unity of reason in its immaterial form of pure 
activity”.25
Ravaisson draws on Aristotle’s theology in spiritualising his physics, 
but the continuist onto-theology that he thus discovers conflicts with the 
Philosopher’s  own  statements  concerning  the  separation  of  the  divine 
from the world, which It moves, in producing desire, without Itself being 
moved. In the  Essay’s first volume, Ravaisson recognises that Aristotle’s 
“Prime Mover is not a soul of the world; it is a principle superior to the 
world,  separate  from  matter,  foreign  to  change  and  time,  and  which 
envelops things, without resting on them”,26 but he does not dwell on the 
challenge  this  poses  to  his  own  interpretation.  In  the  second  volume, 
however, he develops the problem: “if the first principle is … separated 
from nature”,  if  “it  is  only an end that natural  powers tend and move 
towards”, then “from where do these powers obtain the desire that moves 
them? How to attribute to them, if  they are outside the sole  veritable 
being,  this  sort  of  being and reality”?27 A transcendent God, Ravaisson 
now seems to think, will undermine the essence of Aristotelian physics. 
Ravaisson argues that this problem is pivotal in the development – the 
decline  –  of  Greek  philosophy  after  Aristotle:  as,  in  the  face  of  this 
problem,  “Aristotle’s  own  school  gradually  abandons  the  characteristic 
idea of his metaphysics, the pure actuality of absolute thought”, the path 
is  opened  to  Epicurean  and  Stoic  materialisms.  This  decline  of 
Aristotelianism could have been avoided had the Philosopher posited the 
continuity of, and thus the immanence of, the divine principle in nature. 
This would allow for a kind of  identity in difference of  divinity and the 
24 Ravaisson, Essai sur la Métaphysique d’Aristote I, p.422.
25 Ravaisson, Essai sur la Métaphysique d’Aristote I, p.482. See 
Aubenque, ‘Ravaisson interprète d’Aristote’, pp.443-4 on this originally 
Schellingian odyssey.
26 Ravaisson, Essai sur la Métaphysique d’Aristote I, p.548.
27 Essai sur la Métaphysique d’Aristote II (Paris, 1846), p.24.
world: a philosophy of continuity can posit their pantheistic identity but at 
the  same  time,  as  Ravaisson  will  write  later,  “gradation  saves 
difference”.28
1837  also  saw  Ravaisson  submit  –  he  must  have  been  working 
ferociously – ‘Of Habit’, Chapter I of the present volume, together with a 
secondary work in Latin on Speusippus,29 as his  doctoral  theses.  There 
exists no official record of Ravaisson’s thesis defence, but Ernest Bersot, 
then a student at the Ecole Normale, later wrote this about it: “Ravaisson, 
nourished early on by Aristotle and endowed with a mind strong enough to 
penetrate the concision of this great genius, was tempted to imitate this 
concision  and wrote  a  doctoral  thesis,  Of Habit,  in  the  manner  of  the 
master. This thesis […] much troubled the judges and I can still remember 
Jouffroy’s profound consternation and the vivacity with which he protested 
against this novelty. But the thesis was remarkable, remarkably defended; 
Ravaisson obtained his doctorate, his text provoked curiosity outside, and 
many desired to obtain the key to this language; many, in turn, wanted to 
use it”.30 Ravaisson’s thesis was not wholly well-received: its aphoristic 
and even oracular style – and doubtless its freedom in relation to Eclectic 
orthodoxy – perplexed Théodore Jouffroy, a leading light of the Eclectic 
school.  Nevertheless,  Ravaisson’s  capacity  to  synthesise  a  range  of 
philosophical influences in an original philosophical work, and to present a 
general  metaphysics  based  on  reflection  on  a  particular,  principally 
psychological phenomenon, was undeniable. His is one of the few doctoral 
theses  –  and  in  the  mid-nineteenth  century  submitting  an  indigestible 
block  of  500  pages  was  not  yet  required  –  that  can  be  considered  a 
philosophical classic.
‘Of Habit’ develops the remarks concerning habit as ‘desire’ in the 
earlier  Essai and re-articulates the philosophy of nature that Ravaisson 
found in Aristotle.31 The continued influence of Schelling’s philosophy of 
identity  is  apparent,  and  would  hardly  be  clearer  were  the  German 
philosopher cited by name, in that Ravaisson’s fundamental metaphysical 
concern is to elucidate the “mystery of the identification of the ideal and 
28 See Ravaisson’s October 1842 letter to Hector Poret: Dopp, Félix 
Ravaisson, p.298.
29 Ravaisson,  Speusippi De Primis Rerum Principiis Placita Qualia Fusse 
Videantur  ex  Aristotele  (Paris:  1838). On this  secondary  thesis  and its 
relation  to  Ravaisson’s  work  on  Aristotle,  see  Dopp,  Félix  Ravaisson, 
pp.221-4,  and  Alain  Petit,  ‘Le  symptôme  Speusippe  :  le  spectre  de 
l’émanatisme  dans  la  pensée  métaphysique  de  Ravaisson’,  Cahiers 
Philosophiques 129/2 (2012), 57-65.
30 Cited in Vermeren, ‘Ravaisson en son temps et en sa thèse’, p.71.
31 For these remarks on habit as ‘desire’, see, in particular,  Essai sur la 
Métaphysique d’Aristote I, p.450.
the  real,  of  the  thing  and  thought,  and  of  all  the  contraries  that  the 
understanding separates”; reflection on habit is here a means of thinking 
beneath and beyond the dualisms of freedom and necessity, mind and 
body, and will  and nature that condition modern thought. In late 1839, 
Ravaisson would finally spend several weeks in Munich in order to consult 
with  Schelling  and  learn  about  his  latest  work.32 That  the  German 
philosopher is not cited by name in the texts of  1837 – in neither the 
published  volume  of  the  Essai  sur  la  Métaphysique  d’Aristote  nor  the 
dissertation on habit – would seem to be the result of, rather than the 
anxiety of influence, prudence on the part  of a young philosopher and 
doctoral  candidate,  since  Cousin  had  already  come  under  attack  for 
Germanising French philosophy by importing post-Kantian thinking,  and 
since  Ravaisson  will  again  be  candid  about  Schelling’s  significance  in 
1840. Other sources cited rather than just paraphrased, however, serve to 
clarify Ravaisson’s approach to Aristotle: Leibniz is crucial for his theory of 
the continuum, his  dynamics,  and his  account  of  petites  perceptions.33 
Ravaisson’s  philosophy  of  nature  is  also  shaped  by  an  attempt  to 
synthesise the views of a range of animist and vitalist doctors from the 
Renaissance to the end of the eighteenth century.34 The most important 
new philosophical  influence  on  Ravaisson’s  thinking  in  1838,  however, 
was Pierre Maine de Biran, whose voluntarist philosophical psychology had 
broken free of the Ideological school at the beginning of the century. Biran 
published  little  in  his  lifetime,  but  he  began  with  a  prize-winning 
dissertation submitted to the Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques 
on  its  question  concerning  the  influence  of  habit  on  the  faculty  of 
thinking.35 Ravaisson takes up Biran’s tentative conjectures in 1802 on the 
‘causes’  of  habit,  as  well  as  the  general  philosophy  of  effort  further 
developed  in  his  later  work,  according  to  which  the  ‘primitive  fact’  of 
32 Dopp. Félix Ravaisson, p.292.
33 For a reading of Ravaisson’s appropriation of Leibniz’s thinking in  Of 
Habit  as involving a return to a form of monadological metaphysics, see 
Jeremy  Dunham,  ‘From  Habit  to  Monads:  Félix  Ravaisson’s  Theory  of 
Substance’,  British  Journal  for  the  History  of  Philosophy,  available  at 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2015.1078775.
34 In this connection, see Jean Cazeneuve,  Ravaisson et la philosophie 
médicale (Paris: PUF, 1958). 
35 See Pierre Maine de Biran, Influence de l’habitude sur la faculté de penser, vol.1 of 
Oeuvres  de Maine  de  Biran,  ed.  F.  Azouvi  (Paris:  J.  Vrin,  1987),  and  M.  D.Boehm’s 
translation of the 1802 dissertation as The Influence of Habit on the Faculty of Thinking 
(Williams and Wilkins,  1929; Westport:  Greenwood Press,  1970).  This translation does 
not, however, contain some of the important notes offering conjectures on the causes of 
motor habit that Biran added to his prize-winning dissertation just before its publication.
consciousness,  a  dual  ‘fact’  of  a  different  order  to  those  of  objective 
experience, consists in the active will meeting resistance.36
Ravaisson  bases  his  approach  on  the  ‘law’  that  Biran,  as  well  as 
others  before  him,  had  apprehended  in  habit:  continued  or  repeated 
action  becomes  less  conscious  but  more  spontaneous,  assured  and 
precise; continued sensation, in also becoming less conscious, produces a 
need, which is manifest when the source of the sensation is removed, as 
when, on a journey, we wake up when the car has come to a stop. Both 
aspects  of  the law,  Ravaisson argues,  are resistant  to  physiological  or 
psychological, realist or intellectual explanation; and both are the result of 
an ‘obscure activity’, a force intermediate between pure activity and pure 
passivity.  The gradual decline of  effort,  and thus consciousness,  in the 
acquisition  of  a  motor  habit  shows  us  that  this  obscure  activity  is 
continuous  with  and not  antithetical  to  the  will  and consciousness;  an 
acquired habit  does not  become “the mechanical  effect  of  an external 
impulse, but rather the effect of an inclination that follows from the will”. 
The movement becomes a tendency, an inclination or propensity to act, a 
now pre-theoretical orientation to goals or possibilities previously posited 
in reflective consciousness. An acquired motor habit is not, therefore, ‘the 
fossilised residue of  a spiritual activity’,  as Bergson, memorably, would 
interpret Ravaisson to say – thereby expressing his own more dualist and 
mechanistic conception of habit – in the influential discourse he delivered 
in  1904 after  taking his  seat  at  the  Académie de Sciences  Morales  et 
Politiques.37 As much as habit naturalises spirit, it also spiritualises nature; 
habit is the ‘descent’ – and this idea of descent is important in relation to 
his  later  conception  of  ‘condescendence’  –  of  spirit  into  matter.  It  is 
precisely insofar as an acquired habit is not fossilised, dead or mechanical 
that Ravaisson can argue that reflection on habit is “the only real method 
… for the estimation, by a convergent infinite series, of the relation, real in 
itself but incommensurable in the understanding, of Nature and Will”. This 
method  certainly  involves  the  difficult  attempt  to  describe  within 
conscious  philosophical  reflection  that  which  by  its  nature  begins  to 
transcend  the  understanding,  namely  tendency  or  inclination.  Yet 
Ravaisson  appeals  to  our  experience  of  becoming  habituated,  of 
becoming  inclined,  as  an  experience  wherein  we  glimpse  a  vital 
spontaneity  continuous  with  both  organic  nature  and  consciousness. 
Consequently, and by the “strongest of analogies”, it is possible to argue 
that  the  continuum  underlying  traditional  mind-matter  dualisms,  a 
36 On these points, see my ‘Ravaisson and the Force of Habit’, Journal of 
the History of Philosophy 49/1 (2011) 65-85.
37 On  this  point,  see  Dominique  Janicaud,  Ravaisson  et  la  métaphysique:  une 
généalogie du spiritualisme français  (Paris: Vrin, 1997) and my ‘Is Habit the “Fossilised 
Residue of a Spiritual Activity”? Ravaisson, Bergson, Merleau-Ponty’, Journal of the British 
Society  for  Phenomenology 42/1  (2011)  33-52,  which  also  examines  the  question  of 
whether Ravaisson is necessarily committed to the thesis that all  acquisition of habit 
begins in reflective thought. 
continuum that  reflection  on  habit  allows  us  to  apprehend,  is  present 
throughout nature as a whole.
Though his brilliant doctoral thesis had met some resistance, many 
would have expected Ravaisson to establish a fine university career. But 
he would never teach philosophy. In  1838 he became principle  private 
secretary  to  Narcisse-Achille  de Salvandy,  Minister  of  Public  Instruction 
and one of Cousin’s political enemies, and although in the following year 
he was nominated at the university of Rennes, far from Paris, he decided 
not to pursue an academic career. This decision was perhaps motivated by 
“preferring a life more worldly, more elevated, more brilliant, far from the 
near  impoverishment  of  professors”,38 but  that  Rennes  was  the  only 
academic  post  open  to  him  indicates  that  his  relations  with  Cousin, 
discouragingly, had soured. Already in 1837, Ravaisson was seen to be 
one of Cousin’s “victims”.39 To explain this dissension, one might point, 
following Bergson, to a difference in temperament, and contrast Cousin, 
the ebullient rhetorician,  with Ravaisson, of  a more philosophical,  even 
ethereal nature, who would have gained the sobriquet ‘Lion’ only for the 
way  he  wore  his  hair.  One  might  also  invoke  personal  allegiances: 
Ravaisson’s  original  philosophical  mentor  at  the  Collège  Rollin,  Hector 
Poret,  who  became his  friend  and,  later,  father-in-law,  also  had  frosty 
relations  with  Cousin  after  deputising  for  him  at  the  Sorbonne.  Yet 
Ravaisson’s differences with Cousin were above all philosophical, and the 
1840  essay  on  ‘Contemporary  Philosophy’,  Chapter  II  of  the  present 
volume, sheds light on the dispute.
This  essay,  as  pellucid  as  ‘Of  Habit’  is  poetic  and  oracular,  is,  in 
effect, a manifesto against Eclecticism and it created a stir. Its occasion 
was a French translation of the work of William Hamilton, product of the 
Scottish  common-sense  school  and  Professor  at  the  University  of 
Edinburgh,  who  had  criticised  –  initially  in  the  Edinburgh  Review  of 
October  1829  –  Cousin’s  attempt  to  use  the  Baconian  experimental 
method  of  observation  and  induction  in  order  to  attain  the  goals  of 
German idealism, i.e. knowledge of the ‘absolute’. Schelling, in the 1835 
preface that Ravaisson had translated, made essentially the same point, 
but from the opposite perspective, and thus as Ravaisson puts it: German 
philosophy “approves of  the end but disapproves of  the means”, while 
Scottish  philosophy  holds  the  “end  to  be  chimerical  and  regards  the 
procedure with which Cousin wants to attain it as a false application of a 
true  method”.  Cousin thus finds  himself  subject  to  criticism from both 
38 Jacques Billard, ‘Introduction’, in De l’habitude: Métaphysique et 
morale, 1-103, p.14.
39 Mme Poret, wife of the philosopher Hector Poret discussed below, wrote 
to her husband in 1837: “Your Cousin is the greatest acrobat I’ve ever 
known.  Poor  Ravaisson  has  now  also  become  one  of  his  victims. 
Fortunately, he already knew him well-enough so as not to be surprised by 
his caprices”; cited in Vermeren, ‘Ravaisson en son temps et en sa thèse’, 
p.85.
sides,  and  after  damning  him  with  faint  praise  –  he  has  a  “grand 
imagination; he likes high peaks,  vast horizons” – Ravaisson makes no 
secret of his own view that the Eclectic synthesis is impossible. A little 
known reformer of empiricism, however, is able to lead French philosophy 
out of this Eclectic impasse: Maine de Biran. It is precisely in attacking 
Hume’s purported extension to psychology of a ‘Newtonian’, experimental 
method that Biran advances his philosophy of effort and active will.40 Biran 
teaches us to renounce considering the mind “from the objective point of 
view, and as somehow belonging to the outside”, and to recognise, pace 
Hume, that in experience there is a direct intuition or apperception of a 
force, namely the force of the will in its meeting resistance. Cousin may 
well have attempted to incorporate Biran’s thinking, but, for Ravaisson, he 
has done so in a way that is as half-hearted as his decision in 1834 to 
begin to edit Biran’s unpublished manuscripts, which he had held in his 
possession for over ten years.41 Incorporation of Biran’s philosophy of the 
will  requires  renunciation  of  the  Scottish  experimental  psychological 
method,  and  only  thus,  Ravaisson  argues,  can  French  philosophy  gain 
common ground with the ideas of agency and activity advanced across 
the  Rhine  by  both  J.  G.  Fichte  and  Schelling;  and  only  thus  can  it 
adequately resolve the problems of philosophical method addressed under 
the  heading  of  ‘intellectual  intuition’.  By  means  of  Biran’s  philosophy, 
therefore,  “France  and  Germany,  by  such  different  routes,  have 
encountered each other again, and the country of Descartes seems near 
to uniting itself in thought, dare I say in heart and soul, with the country of 
Leibniz”.
‘Contemporary Philosophy’ is important not just for showing how its 
author  envisages  a  union  of  nineteenth-century  French  and  German 
philosophy,  but  also  for  underlining  the  originality  of  Ravaisson’s  own 
thinking  in  its  departure  from  Biran’s  voluntarism.  In  its  final  pages, 
Ravaisson  writes:  “[e]ffort  supposes,  as  Maine  de  Biran  recognised 
himself,  an  anterior  tendency  that,  in  its  development,  provokes 
resistance”.  Ravaisson refers  here to Biran’s  account  of  the genesis  of 
effort on the basis of what – despite the phenomenological rigour of his 
analyses – he posited as a pre-existing and objective world independent of 
consciousness.42 Resistance presupposes will, and will resistance, and in 
40 For analysis of Biran’s response to Hume, see Philip P. Hallie, Maine de 
Biran:  Reformer  of  Empiricism,  pp.84-104,  and  my  ‘Is  There  a 
“Dispositional Modality”? Maine de Biran and Ravaisson on Agency and 
Inclination’, History of Philosophy Quarterly 32/2 (2015) 161-79.
41 See Vermeren, ‘Ravaisson en son temps et en sa thèse’, p.75.
42 On this issue, see Michel  Henry,  Philosophie et phénémonologie du 
corps:  essai  sur  l’ontologie  biranienne (Paris:  Puf,  1965)  and  my 
‘Embodiment:  Conceptions  of  the  Lived  Body  from  Maine  to  Biran  to 
Bergson’ in The Edinburgh Critical History of Philosophy, Vol. 4: The 19th  
Century, ed. A. Stone (Edinburgh U.P., 2011) 187-203.
order  to  avoid  a  “vicious  circle”  in  accounting  for  the  advent  of 
consciousness we must posit “that the first movements of the sentient 
being are determined by instinct, an internal force that is quite real, quite 
independent … of the  will  strictly speaking; but the movements whose 
execution must subsequently be guided by the will, cannot take place by 
the  instinctive  act  without  the  individual  being  aware  of  it  by  this 
particular impression (that we name effort)”.43 Biran, then, sees the need 
to  establish  some  continuity  between  the  organic  and  ‘hyper-organic’ 
strata  he  otherwise  consistently  separates,  and  thus  he  posits  an 
instinctive effort that awakens voluntary effort. This move is problematic, 
for it undermines the specificity of the idea of effort in Biran’s philosophy, 
and  ‘Of  Habit’  presents  instead  the  idea  of  an  “effortless  antecedent 
tendency”.  It  is,  thus,  far  from  clear  that  Biran  thinks  instinct  as  a 
tendency in Ravaisson’s sense, but ‘Contemporary Philosophy’ marks out 
more  decisively  its  author’s  distance  from  Biran’s  philosophy  when  it 
characterises the essence of tendency as desire: “the will has its source 
and substance in desire, and it is desire that constitutes the reality of the 
very  experience  of  will”,  for  the  “notion  of  an  object  as  a  good 
presupposes in the subject that wants it the feeling that it is desirable”. 
Ravaisson  deduces  here  what  reflection  on  habit  had  demonstrated: 
desire is continuous with, but prior to, voluntary action and thought. This 
entails that “before the good is a motif in the soul, it is already, as if by a 
prevenient grace, a motive, but a motive that does not differ from the soul 
itself”. Tendency, then, is to be thought as desire that somehow touches 
and even constitutes  the being that  desires,  but  desire  is  still  not  the 
“ultimate source” of the will; in order to desire something “in some way 
we have to put into it its own goodness and felicity; we have to be aware 
of ourselves in it, to feel ourselves, at bottom, already united with it, and 
to  aspire  to  reunite  ourselves  there  again;  this  is  to  say  that  desire 
envelops  every  degree of  love”.  Love,  as  Ravaisson  had written  in  Of 
Habit,  “possesses  and  desires  at  the  same  time”,  and  it  is  the  very 
condition of desire. Biran, then, is a philosopher of will, whereas Ravaisson 
is led, through an idea of tendency and desire, to a conception of love, 
which develops his interpretation of Aristotle’s onto-theology, and which 
will be crucial in his later work. In any case, ‘Contemporary Philosophy’ 
seems  to  authorise  the  following,  doubtless  unsatisfying,  analogy: 
Ravaisson is to Biran as Schelling is to Fichte; and if Biran is the ‘French 
Fichte’,44 it  would  not  be  absurd  to  describe  Ravaisson  as  the  French 
Schelling.
After  his  precocious  philosophical  beginnings,  ‘Contemporary 
Philosophy’, closes a chapter in Ravaisson’s life and work. He would not 
43 Biran, Influence de l’habitude sur la faculté de penser, pp.138-9.
44 See Ives Radrizzani, ‘Maine de Biran: Un Fichte Français?’ in Fichte et la 
France, Vol. 1, ed. I. Radrizzani (Paris: Beauchesne, 1997), 107-140.
again have such a direct effect on the contemporary philosophical scene 
before a quarter century had passed. In the 1840s, he continued to labour 
on the second volume of his Essai on Aristotle, when he was not occupied 
by his duties as Inspecteur général  des bibliothèques, a newly created 
post to which he was appointed in 1839 after de Salvandy had resigned as 
Minister. This post was certainly not a sinecure, but nor was it one that 
Ravaisson would have undertaken with a heavy heart, solely in order to 
fund his scholarly activities and well-connected Parisian life. The position 
involved cataloguing the holdings of exceptional interest in libraries and 
archives throughout France, and allowed Ravaisson to pursue his interest 
in history developed through his intellectual friendships with the historians 
Jules  Michelet  –  translator  of  Giambattista  Vico,  whose  historical 
periodization  and  notion  of  ‘common  knowledge’  was  significant  (see 
‘Metaphysics and Morals’, Chapter X of this volume) for Ravaisson’s later 
work  –  and  Edgar  Quinet.45 Ravaisson’s  duties  allowed  him,  more 
specifically,  to  develop  his  preoccupations  in  the  history  of  Christian 
doctrine. In the summer of 1840, he was tasked – by Cousin, Minister from 
March to October – with the inspection of libraries in the west of France, 
and to his report of the following year, Ravaisson appended some of his 
manuscript  discoveries:46 these  include  unknown  variants  of  Cicero’s 
works  and one of  Voltaire’s  letters,  but  over  half  of  them concern  the 
history of Christian doctrine, including two sermons Ravaisson attributed 
to Augustin, and a long sermon by John Eriugena on the beginning of St. 
John’s  gospel,  presented  as  a  “new  monument  to  the  genius  of  this 
famous founder of  the  mystical  philosophy and theology  of the middle 
ages”.47
In the 1840s Ravaisson was twice rejected as a candidate for  the 
Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques; Cousin was President, but 
Ravaisson also sensed that his interests might appear too “mystical” for 
the philosophy section of that Académie.48 He would have to wait until 
1880 to be received into it. In 1849, however, he was elected into the 
Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres,  the wing of  the Institut  de 
France primarily concerned with classical antiquity and the Middle Ages. In 
1849 and 1851 he read to this Académie his ‘Essay on Stoicism’, Chapter 
45 In  this  connection,  see  Simone  Goyard-Fabre,  ‘Ravaisson  et  les 
historiens du XIXème siècle’, Les Etudes Philosophiques 1984/4, 481-96.
46 Ravaisson,  Rapports  au  ministre  de  l’instruction  publique  sur  les 
bibliothèques de l’ouest, suivis de pieces inédites (Paris, 1941).
47 For discussion of the significance of these texts for Ravaisson, see Dopp, 
pp.280-4, and for more philological detail concerning the Eriugena discovery, 
see Tullio Viola, ‘The Serpentine Life of Félix Ravaisson’, p163, n.26. Ravaisson 
made other significant discoveries in medieval philosophy, including texts by 
William of  Champeaux and Abelard,  in  his  later  reports  of  1846,  1855 and 
1862; see Viola, p.163.
III of the present volume, which he then had published by its press as a 
long, intensely scholarly essay in 1856. The early to mid-nineteenth 
century was a period of decline in the study of Stoicism, “with German 
classical scholars and historians of philosophy interested more in Plato 
and Aristotle than the Hellenistic schools”, even though, as John Sellars 
also  writes,  “one  might  note  in  particular  the  work  of  the  French 
philosopher Félix Ravaisson” as an exception.49 This lack of interest was 
a  function  of  a  negative,  critical  attitude  towards  the  Stoic 
philosophers.50 Ravaisson, despite the remarkable depth and detail of 
his study, shares in some measure this attitude, which he had already 
expressed  in  the  second  volume  of  his  Essai  sur  la  Métaphysique 
d’Aristote. Felicitously, for us, ‘Essay on Stoicism’ summarises the two 
volumes:  after  presenting  Aristotle  as  the  veritable  founder  of 
metaphysics, Ravaisson shows how Stoicism, following Epicureanism, 
falls away from the inner truth of the Philosopher’s problematic onto-
theological doctrine. Ravaisson illuminates the interconnectedness of 
Stoic metaphysical and ethical doctrines, but, on his reading, Stoicism 
presents an “intricate web of paradoxes”, principal among which is its 
attempt to understand metaphysical principles as physical;  “[f]orced 
by reason always to go beyond phenomena falling under the senses to 
a prior cause of unity, while refusing to recognise as real the entirely 
simple unity of what is purely intelligible, the Stoic stops half way, with 
an idea of an unknown cause, which is material and extended, and at 
the same time one and indivisible, a cause that thus reunites, thanks 
to its obscurity, the irreconcilable attributes of the corporeal and the 
incorporeal”. Ravaisson is certainly intrigued by Stoic immanentism as 
a response to Aristotle’s  problematic onto-theology, by its  notion of 
‘tension’ in particular, and he seems to write the essay as if testing an 
interesting hypothesis.  Yet no physics, in his view, can ever replace 
metaphysics.
Ravaisson’s  administrative  career  granted  him  in  1853  the 
opportunity  to  write  philosophically  about  something  that  he  had 
always practised, namely the art of drawing. Newly appointed under 
48 In  a letter  to Hector  Poret  of  October 1842,  Ravaisson wrote:  “I 
realised that my views seemed, rightly or wrongly, to have a mystical 
air, hardly made to please an assembly where political scientists and 
economists predominated”; see Dopp, Félix Ravaisson, p.294.
49 John Sellars, ‘Introduction’ in The Routledge Handbook to the Stoic  
Tradition (forthcoming).
50 See  Katerina  Ierodiakonou,  ‘Introduction’  in  Topics  in  Stoic 
Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) 1-22, p.4.
the Second Empire as Inspecteur général de l’éducation supérieure, he 
was named as president of a commission – which included the painter 
Delacroix and the architect Viollet le Duc among others – tasked with 
reporting  to  Hyppolite  Fortoul,  Napoleon  III’s  first  Minister  of  Public 
Instruction,  on  the  reform  of  the  teaching  of  drawing  in  schools.  
Ravaisson’s views held sway, and he wrote the report of over seventy 
pages in his own name. In its first part, produced here as Chapter IV, 
‘The  Art  of  Drawing  according  to  Leonardo  da  Vinci’,51 Ravaisson 
outlines  a  philosophy  of  the  figurative  arts  with  an  interpretative 
paraphrase of the maestro’s A Treatise on Painting. The art of drawing 
is contrasted with the analytic, scientific spirit of geometry, for art is 
concerned with a quality that geometry, focused on quantity, cannot 
see.  Prior  to,  and  the  condition  of,  visible  form  and  proportion  is 
movement,  which  it  is  the  vocation  of  art  to  express;  drawing  is 
primarily a function, in Leonardo’s words, of the good judgment of the 
eye,  which,  for  Ravaisson,  has  the  task  of  interpreting  the  “silent 
language of visible appearances”, so as to bring forth the movement, 
life and spirit of things. This living, moving spirit is grace, which, as 
Ravaisson will  say after La Fontaine,  is  more ‘beautiful  than beauty 
itself’.  In  thus “not  restricting itself  to reproducing the letter  of  the 
forms and proportions, and in expressing the sense, the character, the 
spirit proper to things, art raises itself from imitation to interpretation”. 
Aristotle, in the Poetics, certainly saw something essential in remarking 
that  art  or  poetry is  more philosophical  than history,  but  art  has  a 
higher mission than merely reporting on the general rather than the 
particular. Figurative art can interpretatively access, Ravaisson argues, 
the individuality of the particular being that, for Aristotle, is being in a 
higher sense.
This was the first expression of Ravaisson’s ardent interest in the 
philosophy and pedagogy of drawing, and he presented these ideas in 
their most developed form in his article on ‘The Teaching of Drawing’, 
Chapter  V  of  the  present  volume,  that  he  contributed to  Ferdinand 
Buisson’s 1882  Dictionnaire de pédagogie et d’instruction primaire.52 
Drawing  divines  the  inner  individuality  of  its  object  by  grasping  its 
51 For reasons of economy, I follow Dominique Janicaud,  L’Art et les 
mystères grecs (Paris: L’Herne, 1985) in producing just this first section 
of the report, but I alter his title ‘L’Art et le dessin d’après Léonard da 
Vinci’.
52 ‘L’enseignement du dessin d’après M. F. Ravaisson’ within the entry ‘Dessin’ of F. 
Buisson  (ed.),  Dictionnaire  de  pédagogie  et  d’instruction  primaire  Vol.  1 (Paris: 
Hachette), pp.671-84, in 1882. Ravaisson wrote two other entries in the dictionary 
that it was not possible to reproduce here: ‘Art’, Vol. I, 122-4, and another on the 
practical aspects of drawing in Vol. II (Paris: Hachette, 1882), 575-80.
serpeggiamento, as Leonardo had put it, its serpentine line: this is “in 
each object,  the  particular  manner  in  which  a  flexuous  line”  is  “its 
generating  axis  …  like  one  main  wave  unfurling  in  little  surface 
waves”.  This  snaking movement,  this  flexuous line,  which geometry 
cannot capture and is the principle of life itself, is not any one of the 
visible lines of the object, but rather a ‘super-physical’, metaphysical’ 
secret that artistic  intuition can capture; it  is  a “sovereign line that 
commands all other lines, […] that lets itself be divined rather than 
show itself, and that exists more for the imagination and thought than 
for the eyes”. 
Bergson  is  right  to  underline  in  his  admirable  discourse  on 
Ravaisson’s life and work – which he was not compelled to publish as 
the final essay of his final book – that this reflection on drawing is not 
ancillary but rather essential to his predecessor’s mature philosophy: 
“[t]he whole of Ravaisson’s philosophy derives from the idea that art is 
a figurative metaphysics, that metaphysics is a reflection on art, and 
that  it  is  the  same  intuition,  applied  differently,  which  makes  the 
profound philosopher and the great artist”.53 Ravaisson’s  account of 
habit  as  the  “sole  true  method  in  philosophy”  seemed  to  depart 
knowingly  from  Schelling’s  promotion  of  art  as  the  ‘organon  and 
document of philosophy’, but by the mid-1850s the French philosopher 
has come to his own particular view that figurative art can grant us 
access to the non-generic, spiritual essence of things: “aesthetics”, as 
Ravaisson  will  write  in  ‘Philosophical  Testament’,  Chapter  XI  of  this 
volume, “is the torch of science”. It is the generative axis of things 
that, in the practice of drawing, is expressed through the vision of the 
artist and the movement of her hands. Thus what in modernity is called 
‘genius’  cannot  be  a  principle  of  ex  nihilo  creation,  deriving  from 
nothing but the artist herself – as Gabriel Séailles will underline in his 
1886  Le génie dans l’art,54 dedicated to Ravaisson – and is rather a 
kind of revelation or divination, at once active and passive.
In the report of 1854, Ravaisson applied his views in challenging 
the mechanical and geometric methods in the teaching of drawing that 
had come to  prominence earlier  in  the century:  the  student  should 
instead begin with direct, intuitive drawing of the embodiment of grace 
in the human figure, by copying models of classical works. Only thus 
can  the  student  genuinely  learn  to  draw.  This  method  was  to  be 
53 Henri Bergson, ‘La vie et l’œuvre de Ravaisson’ in Bergson, Œuvres 
(Paris:  PUF,  1959),  1450-1481,  p.1461;  ‘The  Life  and  Work  of 
Ravaisson’ in  The Creative Mind, trans. M. Andison (New York: 1946), 
220-252, p.231. 
54 Gabriel Séailles, Le génie dans l’art (Paris: 1883).
facilitated by concentrating on parts of the body, principally the head, 
and by copying two-dimensional representations, even photographs of 
classical works. Ravaisson’s proposals were enacted, and in order to 
support them he began to prepare a volume offering, as he describes 
the  project  retrospectively  in  1882,  “a  photographic  collection  of 
models reproducing first-order works of the most excellent masters, in 
their most favourable aspects and with the most favourable lighting”, 
which was to be distributed in all schools.55 Ravaisson’s Les classiques 
de  l’art:  modeles  pour  l’enseignement  du  dessin did  not,  however, 
appear for more than twenty years, which was all the more unfortunate 
in that in 1876, the year after its publication, under a Third Republic 
convinced  that  scientific  and  technical  retardation  had  contributed 
directly to its humiliating defeat in 1870, Eugène Guillaume, Director-
General  of  Fine-Arts  within  the  Ministry  of  Public  Instruction,  had 
Ravaisson’s programme replaced, after acrimonious debate with him in 
committee  meetings,  by  more  utilitarian  and  less  ‘elitist’ 
prescriptions.56 The teaching of drawing should – as Guillaume wrote in 
his  own  1882  article  on  ‘The  Teaching  of  Drawing’  that  Buisson 
counter-posed  to  that  of  Ravaisson  –  be  addressed  to  the  masses, 
“where dreams of artistic vocations are the exception”,57 and tailored 
to the needs of  workers,  for whom habits  of  exactitude are crucial. 
Disconnected  from  the  industrial  realities  of  the  modern  world, 
Ravaisson’s method remained in a kind of empirical imprecision, when 
students  required  the  discipline  of  technical  drawing.  Ravaisson 
retorted that geometry did not have a monopoly on exactitude, and 
that Pascal’s views about a greater, truer, intuitive exactitude should 
not be forgotten;58 that his method had its own utility, particularly in a 
nation such as France with strong manufacturing traditions in the arts 
55 See Ravaisson, Les classiques de l’art: modeles pour 
l’enseignement du dessin (Paris: Rapilly, 1875), and, for more detail on 
the project, Mouna Mekouar, ‘Étudier ou rêver l’antique. Félix 
Ravaisson et la reproduction de la statuaire antique’, Images Re-vues, 
1|2005, document 6; URL: http://imagesrevues.revues.org/222.
56 For a full account of Ravaisson’s controversy with Guillaume, see 
Canales, ‘Movement before Cinematography: The High Speed Qualities 
of Sentiment’, Journal of Visual Culture 5/3 (2006) 275-294.
57 Eugène Guillaume ‘L’enseignement du dessin’  in  Dictionnaire  de 
pédagogie et d’instruction primaire, 684-9, p.689.
58 On this point, see Canales, ‘Movement before Cinematography’, p.284.
of ornamentation and decoration; and that the state has a “duty not to 
refuse to ordinary schools an education designed to arouse the  elite 
minds they might  harbour”.  Denying students  the  right  to  a  liberal 
artistic  education  would doom the  multitude  to  a  slavish,  technical 
“barbarism”, while only a “privileged class” would gain taste and first-
hand experience of the secret of beauty. In promoting thus the equality 
of opportunity and the access of all to a genuinely liberal education, 
Ravaisson attempted to influence the great wave of educational reform 
in the Third Republic. Certainly, Ravaisson’s proposal that “the man of 
the people, on whom material fatality bears with such a burden” might 
“find the best alleviation of his harsh condition if his eyes were opened 
to what Leonardo da Vinci calls the bellezza del mondo”59 – may appear 
breathtakingly  incognisant  of  the  real  social  and economic  changes 
required in order to resolve  la question ouvrière.60 There is, however, 
no  need  to  deny  that  Ravaisson’s  political  stance  is,  in  a  word, 
patrician, or that his political evocations of the past – ancient Greece 
was ruled by gentleness just as the court at Versailles was governed by 
sympathy – are picturesque, to recognise that his proposals concerning 
artistic education are, in themselves, no more a form of ‘reactionary 
dreaming’, even though written over half a century later, than those of 
Friedrich Schiller in his Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man.61
The 1860s saw Ravaisson’s  re-emergence on the contemporary 
philosophical  scene.  When  the  agrégation  de  philosophie  was 
reinstated in 1963, after having been suppressed early in the Second 
Empire by Fortoul, it was Ravaisson’s turn to be nominated – by the 
new minister Hector Duruy, an old Rollin classmate – as the President 
of its jury. This is a position of great influence, since the jury selects 
both  the  subject  matter  and  the  successful  candidates  in  the 
examination. Ravaisson’s appointment must have been surprising: he 
was  to  preside  over  a  university  examination  granting  the  right  to 
59 Ravaisson, ‘Art’,  Dictionaire de pédagogie et d’instruction primaire 
I,  p.123,  Bergson  will  repeat  this  proposal  in  an  even  less  tenable 
fashion by prescribing not the beauty but the novelty in the world. See 
the concluding paragraph of the late essay ‘Le possible et le réel’ in La 
pensée et le mouvant  in Œuvres; ‘The Possible and the Real’ in  The 
Creative Mind, 91-106.
60 A  question  to  which  Ravaisson  returns  in  his  1887  essay 
‘Education’:  Revue  politique  et  littéraire.  Revue  bleue  17,  April  23, 
1887, pp.513-9.
61 See Goyard-Fabre, ‘Ravaisson et les historiens’, p.494 for the claim 
that Ravaisson is a reactionary dreamer. 
dispense  a  curriculum that  he  had  never  taught.62 Yet  Duruy  soon 
provided Ravaisson with an opportunity to confirm his reputation as a 
philosopher  by  entrusting  him  with  the  writing  of  a  report  on  the 
history of philosophy in France, part of a Ministry of Public Instruction 
series  on  the  progress  of  the  arts  and  the  sciences,  for  the  1867 
Exposition  Universelle.  Ravaisson  immersed  himself  in  the 
philosophical  doctrines  and  scientific  advances  of  the  century,  and 
then produced a long report-cum-manifesto outlining, in its concluding 
sections,  a  ‘spiritualist  positivism’  or  ‘spiritualist  realism’  as  the 
culmination  of  the  philosophical  tradition;  a  spiritualist  positivism 
because Comte does not have a monopoly on ‘the positive’, and, in 
fact, offers only a shallow approach to it; a spiritualist realism because 
idealism,  as  Ravaisson  understands  it,  succumbs  to  logical 
abstractions, as does materialism, and passes over the fundamental 
spiritual  actuality  constituting  the  essence  of  all  things.63 The  text, 
Rapport sur la philosophie en France au XIXème siècle, concludes thus: 
If the genius of France has not changed, there will be nothing 
more natural for her than the triumph of the high doctrine, 
which teaches that matter is only the last degree and, so to 
speak,  the  shadow of  existence,  over  systems  that  reduce 
everything to material elements and to a blind mechanism; 
which teaches that real existence, of which everything else is 
only an imperfect sketch, is that of spirit; that, in truth, to be 
is to live, and to live is to think and to will; that nothing occurs 
without persuasion; that the good and beauty alone explain 
the universe and its author; that the infinite and the absolute 
[…] consist in spiritual freedom; that freedom is thus the last 
word  of  things,  and  that,  beneath  the  disorder  and 
antagonisms  which  trouble  the  surface  where  phenomena 
occur, in the essential and eternal truth, everything is grace, 
love and harmony.64
Year  after  year  students  studied  the  Rapport in  preparing  for  the 
agrégation and as Bergson has noted, it effected a “profound change 
of orientation in university philosophy: Cousin’s influence gave way to 
62 As Leroy notes: ‘Notice sur M. Ravaisson-Mollien’, p.357.
63 Ravaisson, Rapport sur la philosophie en France au XIXème siècle 
(Paris: Fayard, 1984), p.243.
64 Ravaisson, Rapport sur la philosophie en France au XIXème siècle, 
p.320.
that of Ravaisson”.65 Ravaisson attempted to give more concretion, as 
we will see, to this new spiritualism in his final philosophical essays, 
but the work of the philosophers he directly influenced and inspired – 
principally  Jules  Lachelier,  Emile  Boutroux,  Bergson  and  Maurice 
Blondel – would show, as Henri Gouhier put it, “how far and correctly 
Ravaisson  saw”.66 This  new  spiritualist  orientation  would  prevail  in 
French  universities  until  at  least  the  late  1920s,  until  Bergson  in 
particular, as its most prominent representative, was subject to bitter 
and influential invective – by Julien Benda, Georges Politzer and Paul 
Nizan – for having mobilised his philosophy in the service of French 
nationalism during the First World War.67 Whether Ravaisson, had he 
been born two decades later, would have been able to resist the new, 
more nationalist philosophical ‘regiment’ led by Boutroux and Bergson 
in 1914, is a question as interesting as it is unanswerable.68
Ravaisson had made a re-entrance on the philosophical scene, but 
his  concerns  extended  beyond  philosophy  in  a  narrow,  disciplinary 
sense, and in June 1870 he was appointed by Napoleon III as Curator of 
Classical Antiquities at the Louvre. Even though he had had no formal 
archaeological training, events very soon offered him the opportunity 
to  demonstrate  his  aptitude  for  the  post,  and  introduced  him to  a 
subject, the Venus de Milo, that would occupy him, even obsess him, 
for the remainder of his life.69 Just two months after his appointment, 
Napoleon III was captured at Sedan by the Prussian army, which then 
65 Bergson, ‘La vie et l’œuvre de Ravaisson’, p.1472; ‘The Life and 
Work of Ravaisson’, p.244.
66 Henri Gouhier, ‘Introduction’ in Maine de Biran, Œuvres choisies 
(Paris: Aubier, 1942), p.22.
67 On the pivotal  nature  of  Politzer’s  critique,  in  particular,  for  the 
course of twentieth-century French philosophy, see Frédéric Worms, La 
philosophie  en  France  au  XXème  siècle:  Moments (Paris:  Gallimard, 
2009), 194-99 and Giuseppi Bianco, Après Bergson (Paris: PUF, 2015).
68 Ravaisson’s philosophy of love would not have been much use for 
the French war effort in 1914. Bergson’s philosophy of will before the 
war,  in  contrast,  was  well  suited  to  it,  as  I  argue  in  ‘Bergson’s 
Philosophy of Will and the War of 1914-18’, forthcoming in the Journal 
of the History of Ideas.
69 For a full account of this story, see Gregory Curtis,  Disarmed: The 
Story of the Venus de Milo (Stroud: Sutton Publishing, 2003).
marched  towards  Paris.  In  the  Louvre,  prized  works  of  the  great 
masters were hurriedly rolled up and sent to Brest, from where they 
could  be  shipped  elsewhere,  while  the  larger  statues  were  merely 
stored in crates in a sandbagged hallway in order to offer them some 
protection against the Prussian artillery. Ravaisson had the museum’s 
most prized statue, however, the Venus de Milo, packed in an oak crate 
and hidden behind two false walls in the basement of another building. 
In May of the following year, after the Siege of Paris and the French 
government’s capitulation, and then the tumult of the Paris Commune 
and the murderous  reprisals  that  followed it,  Ravaisson led  a  team 
back  into  the  basement  of  the  building,  which  had  been  seriously 
damaged by fire during the government’s  struggle to recapture the 
city. The crate had done its job, and, fortunately, a burst water pipe 
had protected it from the flames. Even more fortunately, for Ravaisson, 
the humidity in the basement had softened the plaster with which four 
broken pieces had been reattached to the Venus, two to the left hip 
and two to the right, and these newly detached pieces allowed study of 
the inside of the statue for the first time since it had arrived at the 
Louvre in 1821.
Within a few weeks Ravaisson published the first of his essays on 
the Venus, essays which offer a combination of archaeological scruple 
and  interpretative  freedom  that  recalls  his  philological  and 
philosophical approach in Essai sur la Métaphysique d’Aristote. First of 
all, Ravaisson proposed to right wrongs to which the Venus had been 
subject during clumsy attempts at restoration fifty years earlier. The 
statue is made of two halves that meet across the hips, but Ravaisson 
discovered that for some reason the Louvre restorers had been unable 
to put the detached lower piece of the left hip, which belonged to the 
lower half, into position so that it would be flush with the rest of the top 
of that half. The left hip would thus collapse under the weight of the 
upper half when reunited with it, and so, after attempting to chisel off 
the protruding section of the lower half, the restorers decided to place 
two thin wooden wedges – like elongated doorstops – between the two 
halves, with the wedges inclining down towards the front of the statue, 
and with one wedge marginally lower than the other, so as to make the 
small gap visible from the front between the two halves as small as 
possible  across  its  whole  length.  This  restoration  had  the  effect  of 
inclining the statue “from the left to the right and from the back to the 
front more than it was supposed to”, which entailed “that it did not 
quite have the proportions or movement that it had before”.70 This was 
exacerbated by changes to the base of the statue: the old broken base, 
which Ravaisson shows was not supposed to be level, had been made 
level when fitted inside a new base, which meant that the line where 
70 Ravaisson, Venus de Milo (Paris: Hachette, 1871), p.12.
the two halves of the statue met was now at least six degrees off the 
horizontal.
Ravaisson’s  proposals  to rectify the pose of  the statue – which 
would,  he  argued,  return  more  grace  and  gentleness  to  it  –  were 
vetoed  by  the  Académie  des  Beaux-Arts,  which  was  reluctant  to 
change ingrained viewing habits.  In 1883, however, when repairs to 
the Greek and Roman galleries of the Louvre meant that the Venus was 
put into storage, Ravaisson took the opportunity to have the wedges 
removed. In 1892, he published a second version of his essay – the 
most philosophical, third section of which appears as Chapter VI of the 
present volume – to justify his decision and to defend his interpretation 
of  the  statue.  This  interpretation  takes  up  the  suggestion  of  the 
historian of art and architecture Antoine Crysostome Quatremère de 
Quincy: the relative negligence in the carving on the left side of the 
statue indicates that she was supposed to be viewed from her right, 
that  another  figure must  have stood on her left,  and thus that  the 
Venus  may  well  have  belonged  to  a  Greek  original  of  Roman 
monuments  showing  her  appeasing  Mars.71 The  Venus  had,  he 
suggested, her left arm on the shoulder of Mars, while her right was 
touching his arm, thus imploring him to stay with her rather than go to 
war.  The composition  would  thus represent  Venus’s  victory,  without 
force, over force. Ravaisson essentially concurred, but supposing the 
Mars to be of a similar form to the Ares Borghese, also in the Louvre, 
he spent many years trying to determine the original position of the 
arms of the Venus in relation to this Mars, and even took up sculpture 
in order to do so. Although he urged that no restoration should ever be 
imposed on the Venus, his reconstruction of the ensemble can be seen 
among the plates at the end of the present volume. According to this 
reconstruction,  the  arm  resting  on  the  Mars’  shoulder  was,  pace 
Quatremère de Quincy, the fragment of lower arm and hand carrying 
an  apple  that  had  been  found  in  Melos  along  with  the  Venus.  For 
Ravaisson, it  is  not necessary to reject  these fragments in  order to 
block the hypothesis according to which the Venus was carrying the 
apple of discord after winning the talent show on Mount Ida that was 
the Judgment of Paris, for, loosely held in the hand as a symbol rather 
than  displayed  overtly  as  a  prize,  the  apple  signifies  “felicity  and 
fecundity” instead of the frivolous “triumph of a puerile vanity”.
Aside from the fact that no fragment of the Mars was ever found 
at  the  site  on  Melos,  two  major  objections  stand  in  the  way  of 
Quatremère’s  and  Ravaisson’s  interpretation.  The  first  concerns  the 
base of the statue, which is broken on one side, a break with which, in 
1821, the base of one of the herms also found with the Venus fitted 
71 On Quatremère de Quincy’s interpretation, see Curtis, Disarmed, 
pp.77-83.
well. Now, if the base of the herm originally belonged with the Venus, it 
could not have formed an ensemble with a Mars, for there would have 
been  no  place  for  it  to  stand.  The  base  of  the  herm  carried  the 
inscription “…xandros son of  Menides citizen of  Antioch of  Meander 
made the statue”, which was troubling, since Antioch was not founded 
until 270 BC and the statue was supposed – by curators keen to make 
up for the return of  the Apollo  Belvedere to Rome after Napoleon’s 
defeat, and to rival Elgin’s appropriation of the Parthenon Marbles – to 
be a masterpiece from the classical age of Greece. A drawing of the 
base of the herm is all we now have, for it was removed and ‘lost’, but 
Ravaisson  adopts  the  view that  led  to  its  removal,  namely  that  its 
attachment  to  the  base of  the  Venus was  the  work of  rudimentary 
restoration, which would explain why the first letters of the name of 
the artist are missing. Ravaisson’s dating of the statue does not rely on 
his arguments to this effect, since, by 1892 at least, he concedes that 
rather than an original, classical work, the Venus is a later reproduction 
of a work from the classical period, but his interpretation of the original 
composition certainly does.
A second objection, which Quatremère had already met, is  that 
Mars was little worshipped in classical Greece, and apparently not in 
his association with Venus, the story of which was recounted by Homer 
merely  as  an  adulterous  affair.  Ravaisson  responds  by  pointing  out 
classical  monuments  featuring  Venus  and  Mars  together,  and  by 
disputing the veracity of the poetic narrative in relation to ordinary and 
early  Greek  beliefs:  the  union of  the  two divinities,  he  claims,  was 
essential to popular Greek religious and moral ideas – ideas to which 
the  poets  were  often,  as  in  this  case,  unfaithful  –  as  a  symbol  of 
conjugal  felicity.  Certainly,  Venus  came  to  be  worshipped  in  many 
places as hetaera, i.e. as a courtesan, and came to be worshipped by 
courtesans  in  particular;  but,  Ravaisson  notes,  hetaera  originally 
means ‘friend’, and only later, as in Plato’s Symposium, does ‘earthly’ 
Venus  Pandemos  (Venus  for  ‘all  the  people’),  now  with  specially 
lascivious  significance,  emerge  from  Venus  Urania.  Ravaisson’s 
ultimate  motivations  become  apparent,  however,  with  his  further 
argument that what is named the Ares Borghese is, in fact, a figure of 
the  hero  Theseus,  a  mythological  human  and  not  a  divinity,  who 
established  the  cult  of  Venus  Urania  when  founding  Athens.  The 
composition  of  Venus  appeasing  Theseus  would  thus  offer  the 
“expressive image of a divine grace seeking out humanity in order to 
unify itself  with it;  a conception that was not foreign to Judaism, in 
which Jehovah goes to the front of the chosen people to bring them 
closer  to  him,  and  that  the  Christian  religion  was  to  carry,  after 
paganism  and  Judaism,  to  a  new  height.”  The  composition  would 
represent  the  generosity  of  a  divine  principle  that  lowers  itself  to 
humanity in order to raise humanity back up to its level; it would show, 
as Ravaisson will put it, the divine as a principle of ‘condescendence’. 
This is what Ravaisson attempts to capture in the Venus de Milo, and 
on this point Bergson says it all: “People smiled to see him model and 
remodel the arms of the goddess. Did they know that what Ravaisson 
was really trying to recapture in the rebellious clay was the very soul of 
Greece […]?”72
In  having  the  wedges  between  the  two  halves  of  the  statue 
removed, and in protecting it from any restoration, Ravaisson played a 
crucial  role  in  the  curation  and  conservation  of  the  Venus  de  Milo. 
Later, however, more single-mindedly scientific archaeologists such as 
Solomon Reinach and Adolf  Furtwängler,  who locked horns over the 
Venus,  agreed  about  at  least  one  thing,  namely  that  Ravaisson’s 
‘inductions’ – which include the conjecture that the statue is modelled 
on the Venus of the Gardens, known only through textual sources, by 
Phidias  or  his  school  –  were  ill-founded.73 The  philosophical 
interpretation of Greek existence underlying Ravaisson’s interpretation 
of  the  Venus,  however,  also  leads  him  to  similarly  controversial 
archaeological claims concerning, to cite the title of Chapter VII of the 
present  volume,  ‘Greek  Funerary  Monuments’.  In  1873,  a  marble 
funerary lekythos – a tall vessel normally used for storing oil – bearing 
the name Myrrhine above a bas-relief showing her being led by Hermes 
to, presumably, the underworld and towards figures representing her 
family,  was found in  Athens,  and a mould of  it  sent  to the Louvre. 
Given the position of her family, and that a member of it, “an old man, 
perhaps  her  father,  raises  his  right  hand  in  a  gesture  or  joy  and 
admiration”, and also that “Myrrhine inclines her head with a gracious 
gentleness  and smiles”,74 the  scene resists  interpretation  as  one of 
separation  or  departure.  Ravaisson  takes  this  newly  discovered 
monument,  dated to  420-410 BC,  to  offer  the  interpretative  key to 
‘departure  scenes’  in  Greek  funerary  art  in  general:  these  scenes 
should  instead  be  named  “reunion  scenes”,  and,  more  precisely, 
“reunion scenes in Elysium”,75 for they present – with varying degrees 
72 Bergson, ‘La vie et l’œuvre de Ravaisson’ in Bergson, Œuvres (Paris: 
PUF, 1959), p.1477/‘The Life and Work of Ravaisson’, p.247.
73 In this connection, see Curtis,  Disarmed, Chapter V, and Reinach’s 
brief  notice  on  Ravaisson’s  archaeological  work  in  Revue 
archeologique 1900/I, p.460.
74 Ravaisson, Le monument de Myrrhine (Paris: 1876), p.2. This essay 
is reproduced in Ravaisson, L’Art et les mystères grecs, 207-38.
75 Ravaisson, Le monument de Myrrhine, p.3.
of  potentially  misleading simplification,  and according to an equally 
misleading  all  too  ‘material’  conception  of  the  future  life  barely 
distinguishing it from this one – gracious greetings in another world. If 
we recognise,  Ravaisson argues,  that the classical  Greeks,  from the 
beginning, and like the peoples with which they were in relation, did 
indeed have a  conception  of  a  future  life,  we will  be more able  to 
recognise joyful, Elysian greetings in these scenes. Ravaisson believes 
that he can announce “without any temerity that soon the views I had 
to  combat  will  have  hardly  any  adherents”,  but  contemporary 
scholarship  tends  to  explain  the  scenes  as  representations  of  our 
material, human world, even when it is indeed a reunion scene that is 
represented. In the words of  Alain Pasquier,  a classical  art historian 
who has occupied Ravaisson’s position at the Louvre, it approaches the 
question with more “prudence”, considers that there was probably an 
“evolution  in  the  spirit  of  funerary  bas-reliefs”,  and  is  reluctant  to 
reduce  the  interpretation  of  these  scenes  to  a  single  “key”.76 
Ravaisson’s  proposals  are  not  without  merit,  but  his  philosophical 
commitments  do  not  allow  him  to  pay  sufficient  attention  to  an 
essential  ambiguity  in  some  of  these  scenes,  an  ambiguity  also 
expressed in  the  Greek  salutation  chaire,  used on  both  arrival  and 
departure.
‘Mysteries’, Chapter VII of this volume, offers a study of Greek 
religion  whose  necessity  Ravaisson  had  already  announced  in  the 
second  volume  of  his  Essai  sur  la  Métaphysique  d’Aristote,77 and 
presents  more  deliberately  his  view that  “the  system of  ideas  and 
practices  that  constituted  the  basis  of  both  dogma and  worship  in 
paganism, in Judaism and then in Christianity, and then everywhere 
else, is something universal and eternal.” The Eleusinian mysteries, he 
argues, were “a great concert of admiration and recognition”, whose 
ultimate purpose was to achieve a “union, whose image was conjugal 
partnership,  with  eternal  beauty”;  and  the  “supreme realisation”  of 
these ideas is later “announced by Christianity in the coming reign of 
pure  Spirit”.  This  approach  could  easily  be  taken  to  express  an 
unremarkable  Christian  apologetics,  yet  Ravaisson’s  Christianity  is 
hardly orthodox: the “Gospels allow us to glimpse through certain veils, 
but to glimpse nevertheless, an intimate union with the divine essence 
as the consummation of religion, and it is in this that a dream of both 
paganism and Judaism,  opposed in  so many other  respects,  will  be 
realised”. The Gospels, therefore, are still the inchoate expression of a 
76 See Dominique Janicaud, ‘Entretien avec Alain Pasquier’ in 
Ravaisson, L’Art et les mystères grecs, 241-6, p.243.
77 See Essai sur la Métaphysique d’Aristote, II, p.350.
spiritual truth towards which paganism and Judaism already yearned, a 
truth  which  will  be  realised,  Ravaisson  suggests  here,  only  in  the 
middle-ages. Moreover, if the Christian message is new, Jesus Christ is 
the “new Prometheus and the new Orpheus”, as Ravaisson will write in 
‘Philosophical Testament’, and he is “in agreement with Hellenism”.78 
Ravaisson’s views on the continuities or discontinuities between the 
Greek and Christian worlds depend on whether he writes of Greek art 
and religion or its philosophy: Venus may well reappear in Christianity, 
but the pinnacle of Greek philosophy, as he writes in a fragment of the 
unfinished third volume of  his  Essai  sur  la  Métaphysique d’Aristote,  
“remained, amidst a religious world and the doctrine of nature, as a 
promise  that  could  not  be  realised.  It  is  in  another  world,  and  in 
another doctrine that that it would gain its realisation, in the world and 
the doctrine of Spirit”.79 Aristotle’s idea of a lofty, immovable divinity 
had  to  be  developed,  within  another  horizon,  in  terms  of  a  divine 
principle of love, self-abandon and ‘condescendence’.
Ravaisson had not, then, come to focus on erudite researches in 
archaeology  and  the  history  of  religions  at  the  expense  of  his 
philosophical  work.  On  the  contrary,  the  thematic  unity  underlying 
Ravaisson’s diverse professional and intellectual activities as archivist, 
historian, pedagogue, curator and philosopher is as remarkable as the 
continuity  in  the  development  of  his  thinking  as  a  whole.  It  is  not 
necessary  to  delve  too  deeply  below  the  surface  to  divine  the 
serpeggiamento  uniting  Ravaisson’s  work.80 It  is  through  the 
“philosophical  paleontology”81 in  his  archaeological  researches  that 
Ravaisson pursues his original Aristotle project, and that he is led to 
the philosophy of revelation – which is clearly indebted to Schelling’s 
philosophy of revelation that Ravaisson had studied closely82 – of his 
later essays. 
78 The final citation is from a fragment published by Dominique 
Janicaud in Ravaisson et la métaphysique, p.262.
79 Ravaisson, Essai sur la Métaphysique d’Aristote: Fragments du 
Tome III (Héllenisme-Judaisme-Christianisme), ed. Devivaise, p.54. 
80 See, again, Viola, ‘The Serpentine Life of Félix Ravaisson’.
81 Ravaisson,  ‘Discours  pour  la  séance  publique  annuelle  de 
l’Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques’, 5 December, 1896.
82 See J.-F. Courtine, ‘Les relations de Ravaisson et de Schelling’.
The first of these essays is the 1887 ‘Pascal’s Philosophy’, Chapter 
IX of this volume. Pascal, Ravaisson proclaims, is a philosopher, and 
not  merely  a  combination  of  scientist  and  Christian  apologist,  who 
provides, if not a complete system, then at least the “principles of a 
veritable philosophy” that allows for its harmonisation and unification 
with  Christianity.  The  most  fundamental  of  these  philosophical 
principles is the distinction that Ravaisson had already invoked in his 
reflection on drawing, namely that between l’esprit de géometrie and 
l’esprit de finesse,  translated here as ‘geometric mind’ and ‘intuitive 
mind’. Pascal shows that: “the sciences generally depend on nothing 
other than geometric mind, whereas the arts […] depend on intuitive 
mind; that to deal geometrically with art and morality, in the same way 
as the sciences, is to pervert them; that intuitive mind is, in opposition 
to reasoning or deductive mind, a faculty of immediate appreciation to 
which the name of judgment is particularly fitting”. This is not to say 
that Pascal adequately reflected on art and aesthetic experience, for “if 
he had, he would have noticed that one of its essential characteristics 
is the infinite capacity to undulate in every direction without effort, and 
to be shaped in myriad ways by the folds and unfolds offered by the 
sinuosity of living things (serpeggiamento)”. On this lack, Ravaisson is 
acutely critical elsewhere: Pascal “dives into an abyss without having 
aesthetics  for  a  guide.  He  lacked  Music  and  Painting.  Orpheus, 
Leonardo,  Corregio,  Mozart;  he  remains  a  Jansenist,  an  iconoclast 
holding grace, women and children in contempt”.83 Nevertheless, the 
metaphysical secret that Pascal cannot grasp aesthetically, he grasps 
religiously. His development of the idea of intuitive mind in terms of 
‘the heart’, the organ of knowledge of “first principles”, departs from 
the voluntarism conditioning Descartes’ philosophy, according to which 
the understanding is subordinate to the will. The heart teaches us first 
principles, but it also leads us to the First Principle: “what is in itself 
this  centre to which the heart  teaches us to relate everything,  this 
extremity towards which everything that belongs to intuitive mind, to 
feeling, to judgment tends, whether it is near or far? A higher will with 
which it is our destiny to be reunited.” Pascal’s doctrine of the heart, 
Ravaisson  argues,  allows  for  a  continuity  between  metaphysical 
knowledge and revelation - they approach each other, Ravaisson now 
holds, “by degrees to the point where they come at least to unite and 
83 Ravaisson,  fragment  in  Janicaud,  Ravaisson  et  la  métaphysique, 
p.237. See also Claire Marin, ‘Introduction’ in Ravaisson, La philosophie 
de Pascal (Paris: Sandre, 2007).
interpenetrate”84 – and leads to the summit of the Christian spiritual 
and ethical ideal, namely charity and self-renunciation.
In 1893 the Revue de métaphysique et de morale was founded by 
a group of young philosophers – principally Xavier Léon, Daniel Halévy, 
and Léon Brunschvicg – with the aim of defending ‘philosophy properly 
speaking’ against scientism and Comte’s Positivism, together with the 
forms of  mysticism that  had risen as  a  reaction  to  them.85 For  the 
inaugural  issue,  the  eighty-year-old  Ravaisson  was  chosen  to 
contribute the lead article, which he entitled ‘Metaphysics and Morals’, 
and  which  offers,  once  again,  something  of  a  manifesto  for  a 
philosophical movement, but one that is now active in “many minds”, 
and  no  longer  merely  a  possibility.  After  characterising  Comte’s 
Positivism – and also, much more questionably, Kant’s Criticism, which 
Ravaisson  takes  to  result  in  little  more  than  scepticism86 –  as 
insufficient for the demands of the understanding” as well as for the 
“demands  of  the  heart”,  Ravaisson  sketches  an  anti-Positivist 
philosophy of history: rather than religion giving way to metaphysics, 
and  metaphysics  in  turn  to  positive  science,  “the  instinctive 
perceptions  of  the  early  period  (as  Vico  had  said)  return  to  be 
confirmed  by  the  meditations  of  the  most  profound  thinkers”. 
Philosophy, in other words, grasps genuine positivity not by eliminating 
religion and metaphysics, but by synthesising them. The account of the 
history  of  philosophy  that  subtends  this  philosophy  of  history  also 
consists of three essential moments: Aristotle grasps, beneath Platonic 
idealising abstractions, the positivity or actuality of being; Descartes 
shows how this principle of activity and actuality is to be grasped in the 
mind itself, ultimately as will; Pascal leads us to grasp, beneath the 
will,  the  heart.  This  history  of  modern philosophy is  strictly  franco-
français,87 but,  for  Ravaisson,  in  the  heart  is  revealed  the  highest 
being, not simply as the pure actuality of thought, but as a principle of 
‘condescending’,  loving  creativity:  “[i]n  everything,  first  of  all  the 
84 Ravaisson, Essai sur la Métaphysique d’Aristote: Fragments du 
Tome III, p.38. 
85 See Stephan Soulié, ‘La Belle époque de la Revue de métaphysique et de morale: 
horizon académique et tentation du politique (1891-1914)’,  Le Temps des médias 
2008/2 (n° 11), pp.198-210.
86 On Ravaisson’s reading of Kant as sceptic, see Andreas Bellantone, 
‘Ravaisson:  Le  Champ  Abandonné  de  la  Métaphysique’,  Cahiers 
philosophiques  129/2, 5-21. It should not be forgotten, however, that 
‘Of Habit’ (Part II, Section I) – in a rather difficult manner – attempts to 
incorporate the findings of Kant’s ‘transcendental aesthetic’.
perfect, the absolute, the good, that which owes its being only to itself; 
next  there  is  what  results  from its  generous  condescendence,  and 
which, by virtue of what the absolute has left behind gradually climbs 
back up to it”. This is not simply a Plotinian idea of divine emanation, 
and if  it  can be described as  a  form of  kenosis,  it  is  necessary  to 
distinguish,  following  Denise  Leduc-Fayette,  an  ontological  from  a 
historical kenosis in Ravaisson’s onto-theology, even though the two 
are inseparable:88 things are given by a principle that “gives to the 
point of offering itself up”, but such a gift allows for a return of the 
created,  in  time –  through nature,  humanity  and history and divine 
condescendence – to the primal source. As ‘Pascal’s Philosophy’ puts it: 
“Humanity having fallen, because it has detached itself from its own 
principle, it is necessary, in order to raise it up, that this principle itself 
descend into it; it is necessary that the principle lower itself into this 
region where humanity has let itself fall, that it make itself a mediator, 
so to speak, and that it bring humanity back, reborn, to the extremity 
of perfection for which it was made. This is what is called incarnation 
and redemption”.
When Ravaisson died in 1900, he left notes for a substantial work 
on his desk. Xavier Léon collated and published them as ‘Testament 
Philosophique’  –  this  was the title  that  Ravaisson gave the work in 
conversation  during  the  last  years  of  his  life  –  in  the  Revue  de 
métaphysique et de morale in 1901, and a second, expanded edition, 
translated as the final chapter of the present volume, was produced by 
Charles  Devivaise  in  1933.  This  ‘Philosophical  Testament’  presents 
Ravaisson’s attempt to draw together a metaphysics, aesthetics and 
ethics  as  a  philosophy  of  love.  Although  it  is  constituted  from 
fragments, the “organic architecture”89 of Ravaisson’s thinking in the 
87 Should we “perhaps add Leibniz, with his monadology” to this list, 
as  Bellantone  suggests  (‘Ravaisson:  Le  Champ  Abandonné  de  la 
Métaphysique’, p.19)? Ravaisson states why he did not, despite all that 
he borrows from Leibniz, in the very same essay: “It is perhaps due to 
not having as profound an awareness of what is special and superior in 
the order of thought that Leibniz attempted, vainly, to replace with his 
pre-established harmony between the body and the mind their  real 
union, and to explain the free decisions of the will by a preponderance 
of motives which transports to the spiritual sphere a mechanism of the 
corporeal world that is itself more apparent than real.”
88 Denise Leduc-Fayette, ‘La Métaphysique de Ravaisson et le Christ’ 
in Les Etudes Philosophiques 1984/4, pp.511-27.
89 Claire Marin, ‘Introduction’ in Ravaisson, Testament Philosophique 
(Paris: Allia, 2008), p.7.
intertwining  of  its  three  key  themes  or  streams,  is  evident.  The 
metaphysics opposes the “nihilism” of those who “finding no force and 
no  greatness  within  themselves,  see  also  outside  of  them  only 
weakness  and  smallness”,  and  “have  no  difficulty  admitting  that 
everything  was  formed  from nothing”.  Everything,  on  the  contrary, 
begins from a principle of liberality, and the organic world is witness to 
this: the living being tends towards its goal, as even Claude Bernard 
had recognised after attempting to reduce life to the laws of physics 
and  chemistry,  but  this  is  not  a  drive  towards  a  conceptual  aim. 
Instead, it is a kind of “thought without reflection”, an instinct, desire 
or tendency that, as Ravaisson had shown over half a century earlier, 
is instantiated in our habits. This approach serves to account for the 
development  of  particular  beings,  certainly,  but  also  for  the 
“successive  production  of  different  species”.  In  evolution,  “[t]he 
creative principle, with the lines through which it is embodied, spreads 
out,  like  a  spring that  pours  out  into  every part  of  the whole,  and 
transforms  itself  there  so  as  to  be  reborn  even  more  worthy  of 
admiration and love”. Living nature – an élan vital, as Bergson will say 
–  advances  not  by  a  process  of  synthesis  or  association,  but  by 
dissociation, and in the process of spiritual “creative ascent”, “nature 
… would be the history of the soul, a history continued and realised by 
humanity and its art”. It is, however, the loving principle of creativity in 
nature that is the principal object of creativity in art. More than simply 
the  beauty  or  even the  grace in  its  model,  art  can divine  love:  “a 
beautiful  model  …  is  one  where  the  whole  and  the  parts  seem 
permeated by a reciprocal love, and is all the more beautiful as their 
union  appears  more  spontaneous.”  This,  Ravaisson  claims,  is  what 
“Schelling must have wanted to explain when he said that beautiful 
things are those … in which everything seems to love”. Harmony in the 
work of art, in other words, is an expression of a secret, metaphysical 
principle of love, and it is the same principle, Ravaisson argues, that 
should regulate ethics and morality as the art of life. This is not just a 
matter of loving thy neighbour as thyself, but rather of generosity and 
heroic  love  “to  the  point  of  an  entire  immolation  of  the  self.” 
Ravaisson’s ultimate aim is to make minds more “penetrable by and to 
each  other,  open  also  to  each  other,  quite  the  opposite  to  the 
separatism of the present time”, but this is not by providing a “new 
theory for the understanding”, but rather by convincing and changing 
our sensibility with “the contagious force of reality and life”.
*
For philosophers at least, it is regrettable that Ravaisson, occupied by 
other interests and duties, did not complete his Testament, and that his 
spiritualist manifestos did not, after his philosophical renaissance in the 
1860s,  lead  to  more  concerted  works  in  metaphysics,  ethics  and 
aesthetics. It is undeniable that even the sense of ‘spirit’ in the work of 
this ‘spiritualist’ philosopher remains in many respects indeterminate, 
for us to determine, and that Ravaisson could have addressed more 
directly the fundamental tensions in his philosophy of spirit as actuality 
and, at the same time, as ‘something’ actual. In the end, it was more 
of an impulse than a doctrine that he transmitted to twentieth-century 
French philosophy, an impulse manifest not only in Bergson’s Creative 
Evolution and  The Two Sources of Morality and Religion,90 but also in 
the  work  of  later  phenomenologists  such  as  Paul  Ricoeur,  whose 
Freedom and Nature: The Voluntary and the Involuntary91 returns to ‘Of 
Habit’, and  Maurice  Merleau-Ponty,  who  addresses  the  idea  of  the 
‘serpentine line’ in Eye and Mind.92 Even on the other side of the Rhine, 
this impulse did not pass unnoticed, since Ravaisson’s significance was 
highlighted  by  Martin  Heidegger,  who  must  have  seen  in  him  a 
philosopher  revitalising  the  question  of  being,  a  philosopher  whose 
spiritualist  reading of  the  Metaphysics,  according to which being as 
spirit is the highest being, brings to the fore the problem of the ‘onto-
theological constitution of metaphysics’.93
This  selection  of  Ravaisson’s  essays  contains  all  of  his  shorter 
works in philosophy with the exception of his secondary doctoral thesis 
on  Speusippus.  That  this  text  was  translated for  the  first  time into 
French only in 2012 speaks, indeed, of its secondary status; that it is 
not  included  in  the  present  volume  also  speaks  of  my  linguistic 
abilities. The late Dominique Janicaud’s collection of Ravaisson’s work 
90 L’Evolution créatrice and Les Deux sources de la morale et de la 
religion, Œuvres (Paris: PUF, 1959); Creative Evolution, trans. A. 
Mitchell (New York: Henry Holt, 1911) and The Two Sources of Morality 
and Religion, translated by R. Ashley Audra and C. Brereton (University 
of Notre Dame Press: 1977).
91 Paul Ricoeur, Le Volontaire et l’involontaire (Paris: Aubier, 1950); 
Freedom and Nature: The Voluntary and the Involuntary, trans. E. 
Kohák (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966).
92 Maurice  Merleau-Ponty,  L’Œil  et  l’esprit  (Paris:  Gallimard,  1964); 
‘Eye  and  Mind’  in  The  Merleau-Ponty  Aesthetics  Reader  ed.  G.  A. 
Johnson, trans. M. B. Smith (Evanston: Northwestern, 1993), 121-150.
93 See,  in  this  connection,  Daniel  Panis,  ‘Le  mot  “être”  dans  “De 
L’habitude”’, Les Etudes Philosophiques 1993/1, 61-64.
on art and religion – L’Art et les mystères grecs (Paris: L’Herne, 1985) – 
partially guided the present selection, but I added to it the key 1882 
dictionary  entry  ‘On  the  Teaching  of  Drawing’,  and  omitted  ‘Le 
monument de Myrrhine’,  since it  covers the same ground as ‘Greek 
Funerary  Monuments’.  A  full  bibliography  of  Ravaisson’s  published 
work, which comprises over eighty items, can be found at the end of 
Joseph Dopp’s Félix Ravaisson: la formation de sa pensée d’après des  
documents  inédits  (Louvain:  Editions  de  l’Institut  Supérieur  de 
Philosophie, 1933).
It  was  not  possible  to  present  a  critical  edition  of  the  essays 
selected, since the apparatus required could not be contained with the 
essays in a single volume. Besides, it would be odd to attempt such a 
project  in  English  when  no  such  edition  yet  exists  in  French.  The 
translators  have,  however,  occasionally  supplied  translations  of  the 
passages  of  Greek  and  Latin  in  the  body  of  the  text  that  are 
unaccompanied by an interpretative paraphrase. Either in the body of 
the text or in footnotes, these translations of Greek and Latin appear in 
square  brackets.  Occasional  explanatory  notes  on  the  part  of  the 
translators  are  also  presented  in  square  brackets,  and  when  they 
derive from the work of Janicaud, they are preceded by his name. The 
translations have been standardised across the volume, but it should 
be  noted  that  in  this  volume  of  French  ‘spiritualism’  there  is  no 
consistent rendition of l’âme or l’esprit – these are rendered variably as 
soul, spirit or mind depending on the context and even the mood of the 
translator.
My  thanks  are  due  to  Frank  Chouraqui,  Tullio  Viola,  Delphine 
Antoine-Mahut, Jeremy Dunham, Christophe Perrin, Christophe Satoor, 
Eugenio  Mozzarelli,  Christopher  Paone  and  Kevin  Temple  for  their 
generous and insightful comments on a first draft of this introduction. I 
am also  indebted  to  John  Sellars  for  his  patient  advice  concerning 
Ravaisson’s  classical  scholarship  in  ‘Essay  on  Stoicism’;  to  my 
departmental  colleague Jason Crowley for  advice on Greek funerary 
‘departure scenes’; to Matthew Barnard and Caroline Baylis-Green for 
occasional lexical inspiration; and to Liza Thompson and Frankie Mace 
at Bloomsbury for accepting my proposal for the volume and for their 
care in its production.
M.W.S.  
   
                                    
Note on the Texts
‘Of Habit’ was first published as De l’habitude in Paris by H. Fournier in 
1838. The translation here is modified, by Mark Sinclair, from his 2008 
(London: Continuum) translation with Clare Carlisle.
‘Contemporary  Philosophy’,  translated  by  Jeremy  Dunham,  was 
originally  published  as  ‘Philosophie  Contemporaine:  Fragmens  de 
Philosophie  par  M.  Hamilton’  in  La  Revue  des  deux  mondes  1840, 
pp.397-427.
‘Essay on Stoicism’, translated by Adi Efal and Mark Sinclair, was first 
published as Mémoire sur le Stoïcisme, Mémoires de l’Institut Impériale  
de France, Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres, vol. XXI, 1857, 
pp.1-94.
‘The Art of Drawing according to Leonardo da Vinci’ is a translation, by 
Mark Sinclair, of the first, untitled main section of ‘Rapport addressé à 
M. le ministre de l’Instruction publique et des cultes’, December 28, 
1853,  published  in  1854  as  De l’enseignement  du  dessin  dans  les  
lycées (Paris: Dupont).
‘On  the  Teaching  of  Drawing’,  translated  by  Tullio  Viola  and  Mark 
Sinclair, was originally published under the heading ‘L’enseignement 
du  dessin  d’après  M.  F.  Ravaisson’  within  the  entry  ‘Dessin’  of  F. 
Buisson (ed.), Dictionnaire de pédagogie et d’instruction primaire Vol. 1 
(Paris: Hachette), pp.671-84, in 1882.
‘The Venus de Milo’, translated by Mark Sinclair, is the third section, 
pp.188-256, of the  La Venus de Milo in  Mémoires de l’Académie des 
Inscriptions  et  Belles-Lettres,  1892,  vol.  XXXIV,  Part  I,  pp.145-256, 
which was also published as an off-print by Klincksieck, Paris, in the 
same year. 
‘Greek  Funerary  Monuments’,  translated  by  Mark  Sinclair,  was 
originally published as ‘Les monuments funéraires des Grecs’ in Revue 
politique et littéraire. Revue bleue,  April 10, 1880, vol. XVIII, pp.963-
970.
‘Mysteries: Fragment of a Study of the History of Religions’, translated 
by Mark Sinclair, was originally published as ‘Les mystères. Fragment 
d’une étude sur l’histoire des religions’ in Revue politique et littéraire,  
Revue bleue,  19 March 1892, pp.362-6, and appeared as an off-print 
(Paris: Picard) the same year.
‘Pascal’s Philosophy’, translated by Mark Sinclair, was published as ‘La 
philosophie de Pascal’ in La Revue des deux mondes 80, 1887, pp.399-
428.
‘Metaphysics  and  Morals’,  originally  published  as  ‘Métaphysique  et 
Morale’  and translated by  Mark  Sinclair,  was  the  lead essay in  the 
inaugural issue of the  Revue de métaphysique et de morale in 1893, 
pp.6-25.
‘Philosophical  Testament’,  translated  by  Jeremy  Dunham  and  Mark 
Sinclair,  was first  edited and published by Xavier Léon in  Revue de 
métaphysique  et  de  morale  9/1  (1901),  pp.1-31,  and  a  second, 
expanded  edition  of  the  text,  which  is  reproduced  here,  appeared 
thanks to Charles Devivaise in 1933 (Paris: Boivin).
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